_ Yuri Kofner, economist, MIWI Institute for Market Integration and Economic Policy. Munich, October 19, 2022.
The current energy crisis in Germany is reflected both in the lack of energy security and in skyrocketing energy prices. A gas and power shortage is very likely for the winters of 2022/3 and 2023/24. Compared to early 2021, sales prices for all energy sources have skyrocketed.
The energy transition, CO2 pricing and the sanctions policy are the real reason for the domestic energy crisis, which would have come sooner or later but was finally triggered by the Ukraine war.
The current measures of the so-called traffic light government (SPD, Greens, FDP), such as the gas price cap, are insufficient and economically counterproductive, since they hardly relieve the citizens and companies and do not increase the energy supply.
On the contrary, the AfD has developed a simple but effective energy security and relief package, as it is based on two basic measures: a drastic reduction in the tax and bureaucratic burden on energy sources and a noticeable increase in the energy supply. The proposed measures are effective both immediately and in the medium term.
– Abolition of the national CO2 tax and German participation in the EU emissions trading system
– Reduction of the electricity tax to the EU minimum
– Reduction of energy taxes to the EU minimum
– Reduction of VAT on energy sources to the EU minimum
– In the case of electricity and heat, these tax reliefs could potentially be granted up to a certain consumption limit or depending on savings in consumption.
|Expanding energy supply:
– Lifetime extension of 6 instead of only 3 German nuclear power plants (additional 4.1 GW)
– Regular grid operation of German coal-fired power plants that are currently outside the electricity market (6.5 GW)
– 20 percent increase in domestic biomethane production (7 TWh per year) by reducing bureaucracy
– Opening of the remaining Nord Stream 2 pipeline (225 TWh per year)
– Increase in domestic gas production (undeveloped unconventional reserves of 26,866 TWh)
– Expansion of hydropower (5.5 GW) and geothermal energy (max. 70 GW)
As a result, these actions would:
– Immediately close the expected gas and power gap, probably even with a surplus.
– Reduce the current electricity price for households by 25.4 percent (9.5 cents per kWh) and save every German household by an average of almost 300 euros per year.
– Reduce the electricity price for industrial customers by 19.1 percent (7.7 cents per kWh) and relieve every industrial company by an average of 78,000 euros per year.
– Reduce the price of diesel by 18 percent (40 cents per liter) and save every household an average of 376 euros a year.
– Reduce the price of petrol by 26 percent (51 cents per liter) and save every household an average of 478 euros a year.
– Lower the gas price for home heating by 26.5 percent (4 cents per kWh) and save every household with gas heating by an average of 717 euros per year.
– Reduce the gas price for industry by 24 percent (4.8 cents per kWh) and save a typical energy-intensive industrial group, such as Wacker Chemie AG, by more than 200 million euros per year.
– Reduce the price of heating oil for house heating by 20 percent (3 cents per kWh) and relieve every household with gas heating by an average of 541 euros per year.
– Save every household with electric heating, e.g. heat pump, by an average of 1,680 euros per year.
– Does not demand any debt-financed additional expenditure from the federal budget, but only means a manageable loss of revenue of around EUR 56.3 billion.
Effects and dangers of the current energy crisis
The current and expected energy crisis harbors two dangers: exorbitantly rising energy prices and, in the worst case, a potential shortage of gas, heat and electricity in the colder seasons of 2022/23 and 2023/2024.
In view of the loss of natural gas imports from Russia, including due to the terrorist attack on the Nord Stream 1 and 2 subsea pipelines, leading German research institutes believe that gas rationing by German industry in January-March 2023 is very likely. In the event of colder than usual temperatures, gas gaps in spring 2023 and winter 2023/2024 are forecast to be very likely. This would trigger the last level of emergency in the BMWK’s “Gas Emergency Plan” and lead to a catastrophic recession of the German economy of 7.9 percent in 2023 and 4.2 percent in 2024. Overall, the loss of added value would amount to more than 193 billion euros and around 5.6 million domestic jobs would be affected.
In addition to the impending gas shortage, the gas price, which has risen sharply, is causing problems for the domestic industry. Between July 2015 and April 2021, the average wholesale gas price in Europe (Dutch TTF) was around 16 euros per MWh. By August 2022, the price had exploded 15-fold to over 230 euros per MWh. Interestingly, the price had already reached 100 euros per MWh in early October 2021, almost half a year before the war in Ukraine.
By August 2022 German industry reduced gas consumption by 25 percent year-on-year, but this was due to the fact that many production plants had to be closed. The DIHK estimates the resulting loss of added value at 20 billion euros.
Due to the expected gas shortage and the extension of the service life of only three (4.2 GW) of at least six available nuclear power plants (8.3 GW), the network operators expect a nationwide capacity gap of 5.8 GW for the winter of 2022/23. A load shortfall of at least 91 hours (almost 4 days) is expected.
The situation is expected to get worse if some of the 19 million German households that currently heat with gas switch to electric heat pumps – in addition to the more than 1 million households that already heat with it.
Almost 16 percent of German industry with a gross value added of approx. 148 billion euros would be affected by a possible load shedding (brownout). The consequences of a prolonged blackout due to the collapse in network stability would be even more serious.
Even a one-day blackout increases the average mortality rate by 37.9 percent, which would mean over a thousand additional deaths per day in Germany.
In addition to the horrendous humanitarian damage, according to calculations by ewi Cologne, a four-day nationwide power outage in winter would cost 72 billion euros.
Apart from the impending power shortage, the failed energy policy of the government in Berlin has led to an explosion in electricity bills, which are extremely burdensome for both citizens and companies. From 2021 to July 2022, household electricity prices rose 16 percent from 32.16 to 37.30 cents per KWh, while industrial electricity prices shot up 87 percent from 21.38 to 40.05 cents per KWh are.
In the last two decades, electricity prices have doubled for households and tripled for industry: from 14 to 31.4 cents per KWh and from 6 to 18.6 cents per KWh. This means that Germany now has the highest electricity prices in the world. Even before the Ukraine war, Prognos AG estimated that electricity prices would increase by a further 50 percent by 2025 as a result of the energy transition.
In 2021, 55 percent of German natural gas imports came from Russia (approx. 555 TWh). This is 1.7 times more than the gas consumption for heating German households (310 TWh) and 8.3 times more than for nationwide district heating (67 TWh). According to the above-mentioned “Gas emergency plan”, in the event of gas rationing, households and combined heat and power plants would be the last to be cut off, after industry and commerce. However, in the event of a power failure, gas transport through the pipeline infrastructure is by no means guaranteed. Without heating, the indoor temperature of an apartment falls to around 7 to 8 degrees in winter.
In order to save gas, especially as part of the EU agreement to reduce gas consumption by 15 percent compared to the average of the past 5 years, the traffic light government now stipulates a maximum temperature in public buildings and at the workplace of 19 degrees by federal law.
Such a reduced room temperature increases the viability of viruses and the risk of cardiovascular and respiratory diseases. As a result, this could lead to an increase in lung diseases, which the government could use as an excuse to reintroduce tough restrictions on freedom such as compulsory masks, tests and vaccinations as well as lockdowns.
Citizens and companies are not only endangered by a direct lack of energy, but also by an indirect shortage, which is reflected in the unaffordability of energy.
By August 2022, the prices for electricity had risen by more than 20 percent compared to August 2020, for natural gas without a surcharge by 80 percent and for light heating oil by almost 170 percent. The costs for heating an average family home with gas in the 2021/22 winter season doubled compared to the 2020/21 season from 890 to 1,755 euros, for an average apartment from 455 to 895 euros; those for a single-family house with an electric heat pump have increased by half from 1,030 to 1,505 euros.
From 2020 to 2022, energy poverty, i.e. when a household has to spend more than 10 percent of its income on heating, electricity, hot water and fuel, doubled from 13.6 percent to over a quarter of German households.
The government’s anti-mobility policies have resulted in near-unaffordable fuel prices, making them among the most expensive in Europe and the world.
Between January 2014 and January 2021, the average diesel price in Germany was around 1.20 euros and the average price for a liter of petrol was around 1.37 euros. Since then, both have shot up to €2.15 and close to €2, respectively, in September 2022. That’s an increase in inflation of 80 and 46 percent, respectively. ,
Though a fuel shortage is unlikely, the left-green wing of the traffic light coalition is using the narrative to push through their long-held wish for a speed limit on German autobahns, or worse, a Sunday driving ban like during the 1970s oil crisis.
Reasons for the energy crisis: energy transiton, carbon pricing and sanctions
The federal government and CDU/CSU claim that the current energy crisis was caused by the Russian war in Ukraine. That is, at least, a great exaggeration in order to distract attention from decades of misguided developments in German national energy policy.
Although reduced Russian gas supplies exacerbate the current energy shortage, this itself was created and caused by the federal government’s energy transition and sanctions policy. The following are the most important factors that caused and aggravated the energy shortage and skyrocketing energy prices in Germany.
Even without the Ukraine war, the energy turnaround, i.e. the exit from base load capable and controllable nuclear power and fossil generation in favor of volatile, weather-dependent wind and solar energy, would have led to a capacity gap of 24 GW by 20230.
A total of 8 safe nuclear power plants and over 19 modern coal-fired power plant blocks have been taken off the grid in Germany since 2011.
After a long period of policy swings and a delay of several months, the traffic light government finally decided in October 2022 for a gas price cap of 12 cents per kWh below 20 percent of average consumption for households and 7 cents below 70 cents of average consumption for industry. Although this instrument does in fact provide limited relief and an incentive to save, the gas price brake has several glaring disadvantages: First, it is a massive government intervention against the market-based pricing mechanism. Secondly, gas-fired power plants are excluded from the measure, which is why this will not have any price-reducing effect on the price of electricity. Thirdly, the cost of the gas price brake is calculated at 96 billion euros, which is to be financed by further borrowing from the federal budget while circumventing the debt brake. In the future, these will have to be financed through tax revenues, even though Germany already has one of the highest tax (38.3 percent) and state quotas (52.3 percent) in relation to GDP.
The so-called traffic turnaround is a mobility-hostile continuation of the energy turnaround. The increase in fuel prices is largely due to government failure. For one thing, more than two-thirds of the German petrol station and crude oil refinery market are in the hands of a few oil companies, which could speak of a lack of competition control. Second, the state tax burden on fuel is noticeably high: in mid-October 2022, the tax share was 38 percent for diesel and 47 percent for petrol.
Due to the energy transition, the gas share in the German energy mix has increased noticeably: in primary energy consumption from 15.4 percent in 1990 to 20.7 percent in 2020 (introduction of the EEG) and further to 26.4 percent in 2020, as well as in the Net electricity generation from 6.7 to 8.8 and 16.8 percent, respectively.
It was therefore understandable to look for cheap gas supplies, of which Russian ones were objectively the cheapest: between 2013 and 2021, Gazprom’s average gas price for Germany was 2.7 cents per kWh, about 21 percent cheaper than for other European countries (3.4 cents per kWh), while US LNG was on average 30 to 40 percent more expensive than Russian pipeline gas for Europe.
In 2021, 26 percent of German coal imports came from Russia, 34 percent of oil imports and over half (55 percent) of gas imports. In relation to the total consumption in road traffic, diesel imports from Russia account for almost 15 percent.
Along with other European countries, Germany enacted sanctions against Russian coal and oil that came into effect in the summer of 2022. Although this embargo had a manageable effect on a reduced energy supply with oil (products) and coal, it increased their prices. In June 2022, Russia throttled and completely stopped its gas supplies to Germany from September 2022.
According to Felbermayr et al. the decoupling of economic relations between Russia and the West will reduce Germany’s welfare by 0.4 percent. Even before the Ukraine war, the Western sanctions cost 0.16 percent of German GDP (5.5 billion euros) annually, which is 18 times more than the USA had to bear due to the sanctions regime.
In contrast, Western sanctions on Russian energy sources do not appear to significantly affect Russia’s fiscal capacity. In 2022, Russian government revenues from the oil and gas sector (EUR 136 billion) are estimated to be 31 percent higher than in 2021 (EUR 103.9 billion) and more than double the level in 2020 (EUR 63.3 billion). billion euros).
Another factor is the generally anti-hydrocarbon policy of the German and many other Western governments, which has led to insufficient (stagnant) investments in the global oil, coal and gas sectors over the long term. Both current and threatened political measures such as the EU taxonomy, the emissions trading system, national CO2 taxes and the CO2 border adjustment deter energy companies and investors.
Due to emissions trading, the production costs for lignite-based power generation are 63 percent higher than they could be, those for hard coal 35 percent and those for natural gas 14 percent.
The anti-investment effect of this policy can be visualized using the example of the state of Bavaria: Even before the Ukraine war, the state government had to admit that of the planned and necessary 2.4 GW of gas-fired power plants by 2025, a maximum of 0.6 GW would actually be in operation by the summer of 2023 would become.
Carbon pricing is in itself a direct driver of inflation. According to a recent study by KfW Research, the introduction of the national carbon tax in 2021 increased the CPI by 63 basis points year-on-year and was responsible for over 20 percent of inflation in 2021 (3.1 percent overall). In 2022, due to the national CO2 tax, fuel prices will increase by 7.4 cents per liter, heating oil by 8 cents per liter and natural gas by 0.6 cents per kWh compared to 2020. By raising the CO2 tax to 65 euros per tonne of CO2 by 2026, the inflation rate will be 149 basis points higher than in a scenario without a carbon tax.
Taken together, the climate policy of the traffic light in the form of CO2 pricing will cost the German economy 58.9 billion euros annually until 2030. That’s the equivalent of 1.7 percent of GDP or 711 euros per capita and year.
Solution package of the AfD for safe and cheap energy
To deal with the energy crisis, the AfD party has developed a comprehensive package of solutions that addresses both security of supply and the question of price. It is based on two main pillars: increasing the energy supply and reducing the tax and bureaucratic burden on energy sources. The solution concept is divided into immediate measures and medium-term energy policy decisions.
In the electricity market, the AfD calls for the suspension or abolition of CO2 emissions trading and the reduction of electricity tax, energy taxes and value added tax to the EU minimum. According to calculations by the MIWI Institute, this would reduce the price of electricity for households by 21 percent or 8 cents per kWh. The electricity price for the domestic industry would be lower by 8 percent or 3.2 cents per kWh as a result of this tax reduction. These measures, which can be implemented easily and without bureaucracy, would relieve every average household by 241 euros a year and every industrial company by an average of 32,740 euros a year.
In the fuel sector, the AfD calls for the abolition of the CO2 tax and the reduction of energy taxes and value added tax to the EU minimum. This would reduce the price of a liter of diesel by 18 percent or 40 cents from 2.20 euros to 1.80 euros and make the price of a liter of petrol more than a quarter cheaper – 51 cents from 2.01 euros 1.50 euros. Studies by the ifo Institute have shown that this tax relief is effective in reducing prices, since 85 to 100 percent of it is passed on to customers by the oil companies. Calculated over the year, this measure would relieve every household by around 376 euros (diesel) to 478 euros (petrol).
In order to reduce heating costs, the AfD calls for the abolition of the CO2 tax and the reduction of energy taxes and value added tax to the EU minimum. This would reduce the price of gas for households by 17 percent or 2.5 cents per kWh to 12.8 cents per kWh and would mean savings of 450 euros per year for the average household with gas heating (41.2 percent of German households).  The price of heating oil would be 20 percent or 3 cents per kWh lower, which would save every household with heating oil heating (17.2 percent) by 541 euros per year. The above-mentioned tax cuts in the electricity market would relieve every household with electric heating (17.6 percent), e.g. a heat pump, by an average of 1,375 euros per year.
However, the announced tax reduction on electricity and heat in the general form does not contain any savings incentives, so, ceteris paribus, it increases economic energy requirements without expanding the supply. To address this issue, the tax break package could be combined with one or two conditions. First, the tax cuts could be capped at a consumption limit for households and industry that is 15 to 20 percent below the average level of consumption over the past 3-5 years. Secondly, the tax relief could be granted depending on consumption savings: If, for example, energy consumption is 20 percent lower in relation to the average consumption of the last 3-5 years, then the tax relief is granted on 100 percent of the electricity/heating bill. If consumption is “only” 10 percent lower, the tax reduction is only granted on half of the electricity/heating bill. Apparently, both instruments are associated with higher administrative burdens and do not reward those who have already invested in energy savings in the years before the energy crisis.
On the other hand, the tax cut would be sustainable in terms of fiscal policy. Compared to the gas price cap of the traffic light government, which means further debt-financed budget expenditures of 96 billion euros, the proposed tax exemption package would initially mean a loss of revenue for the state of only 56.3 billion euros annually: 12.5 billion euros for the CO2 pricing, 6.7 billion euros in electricity tax and 37.1 billion euros in energy taxes. However, since the savings potential of each new federal budget for counterproductive ideological expenditure such as “climate protection”, asylum and gender policy is around 20 percent or around 90 billion euros, this loss of income could easily be compensated for.
Short to medium term
In addition to immediate tax cuts, it is essential to increase the supply of – predominantly domestic and base load capable – energy – in good time and noticeably in order to avert the imminent gas and electricity shortage caused by the energy transition. In addition, the expansion of energy production will also have a further price-reducing effect.
First and foremost, the AfD is demanding an unlimited extension of the service life of the 3 German nuclear power plants that are still running and the reactivation of another 3 nuclear power plants that were shut down at the end of 2021. This measure would deliver 8.3 GW and thus reduce the capacity gap expected for the winter of 2022/23 from 5.8 to 1.7 GW. Stress tests by the BMWK, audits by the TÜV, parliamentary expert hearings and initiatives by experts in the nuclear field all show that a longer service life extension of the nuclear power plants is possible and necessary from a legal, technical, safety and economic point of view.
This measure could save around 120 TWh of gas electrification annually, which corresponds to about a quarter of the total German gas imports from Russia in 2021, or two-thirds of the Russian gas used for electrification.
In addition, the AfD calls for all coal-fired power plants to be put into regular operation and advocates a general return to coal-fired power. According to the Federal Network Agency, as of May 2022 there are almost 6.5 GW of potentially available coal-fired power capacity outside the electricity market: 1.9 GW lignite-fired power plants on standby, 4.3 GW black coal-fired power plants in grid reserve and 300 MW lignite-fired power plants that have been temporarily shut down. The takeover into regular operation would more than adequately close the remaining power gap. It should be noted that Germany has the third largest lignite reserves in the world at 35.7 billion tons.
A third demand by the AfD that expands energy supply: through the liberalization of bureaucratic guidelines and requirements, the capacity of domestic biogas plants can be increased by 20 percent by the end of 2023 without affecting food production. This would provide an additional 19 TWh of electricity or 7 TWh of industrial grade biomethane.
Fourth, the AfD calls for the opening of the remaining Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which could supply Germany with up to 225 TWh per year. This would, for example, cover 61 percent of the annual gas consumption of German industry (370 TWh) or almost completely the amount required for gas electrification (250 TWh incl. TC).
The opening of Nord Stream 2 would also lower the current gas electrification price by 17.3 percent to 20.3 cents per kWh, if Germany were to pay around 4 cents per kWh for Russian gas supplies under a possible long-term contract, which is above the Russian gas price for most EU countries (3.4 cents per kWh in the decade before the Ukraine crisis) and would thus supply around a quarter of German gas electricity generation.
Including the above tax cuts, the average household gas price would be 26.5 percent lower, or 4 cents per kWh cheaper, costing just 11.3 cents per kWh. The industrial gas price would be 23.9 percent or 4.8 cents per kWh lower and would now be 15.4 cents per kWh. These measures would save an average gas-heated household by EUR 717 a year and a large energy-intensive industrial company, such as Wacker Chemie AG, by more than EUR 200 million a year. 
The AfD supports the expansion of domestic gas production. In 2021, Germany produced 50 TWh of natural gas (5 percent of domestic consumption). The currently developed gas reserves are estimated at around 313 TWh. The untapped unconventional natural gas reserves in Germany are estimated at approximately 26,866 TWh, which would be sufficient to cover current domestic gas consumption for over 26 years. The ZEW considers the development of these reserves to be economically sensible if the gas wholesale price remains above 50 to 60 euros per MWh, which, among others, the ewi Cologne assumes. According to the AfD basic program, all ecological and health aspects must of course also be considered in such a project.
The timely expansion of the energy supply with nuclear power, coal, natural gas and biogas by the end of 2023, together with the tax cuts mentioned above, would reduce the price of electricity for households by a total of 28 percent or more than 10 cents per kWh to 27 cents per kWh. Household electricity prices have not been cheaper since 2012. The electricity price for industrial customers would now be 21 percent or 9.5 cents per kWh cheaper and would now cost 31.6 cents per kWh.
This new energy policy of the AfD would not only end the energy shortage within a year, it would save every German household by 300 euros per year and every industrial company by an average of 78,000 euros in electricity costs alone.
In the medium term, the AfD also advocates the expansion of domestic and base load-capable hydropower by simplifying the bureaucratic requirements. According to a study by the Federal Environment Agency, it would be technically, ecologically and infrastructural possible to increase the current installed hydropower capacity of 5.5 GW (20 TWh per annum) by 20 percent to 6.6. GW (25 TWh). At 3.7 cents per kWh, hydropower has the lowest electricity generation costs alongside nuclear power (2.7 to 5 cents per kWh).
Finally, the AfD also supports the expansion of geothermal energy, which currently plays only a negligible role in the national energy system: In 2020, the almost 50 MW installed capacity only supplied 0.2 TWh of electricity and 16.4 TWh of heat (with an annual heat requirement of 1283 TWh). According to calculations by the Fraunhofer Institute, the German geothermal potential is 70 GW installed capacity by 2030 or more than 300 TWh annual work, i.e. almost a quarter of today’s German heat requirement.
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 Gabriel Felbermayr G., Mahlkow H., Sandkamp A. (2022). Cutting through the Value Chain: The Long-Run Effects of Decoupling the East from the West. IfW Kiel. URL: https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/kiel-working-papers/2022/cutting-through-the-value-chain-the-long-run-effects-of-decoupling-the-east-from-the-west-17087/
 Flach L., Larch M., Yotov Y., et al. (2020). Die volkswirtschaftlichen Kosten der Sanktionen in Bezug auf Russland. ifo Institut. URL: https://www.duesseldorf.ihk.de/blueprint/servlet/resource/blob/4978912/5ed8077229fa36561337b443b82a386c/m31-rf-ifo-studie-kosten-russland-sanktionen-data.pdf
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 Anfrage zum Plenum des MdL Gerd Mannes (AfD) vom 14.06.2021. Drucksache Nr. 18/16598. URL:
 Herold J. et al. (2022). Grüne Inflation? Zwischen Klimaschutz und Preisniveaustabilität. KfW Research. URL: https://www.kfw.de/PDF/Download-Center/Konzernthemen/Research/PDF-Dokumente-Fokus-Volkswirtschaft/Fokus-2022/Fokus-Nr.-368-Februar-2022-Gruene-Inflation.pdf
 Kofner Y. (2022). Economic policy of Germany’s new coalition government: economic and welfare effects. MIWI Institute. URL: https://miwi-institut.de/archives/1617
 Die Auswirkungen auf den Strompreis wurden wie folgt abgeschätzt: Zunächst wurden die Auswirkungen auf den Nettostrompreis durch die Abschaffung der Zertifikat-CO2-Bepreisung sowie die Senkung der Energiesteuern auf den EU-Mindestsatz auf die verschiedenen im deutschen Strommix für das 1. Halbjahr 2022 eingesetzten Energieträger berechnet. Auf den sich so neu ergebenen Nettostrompreis wurde dann die reduzierten Strom- und Mehrwertsteuern angesetzt. Die Daten stammen von: BDEW, Tech for Future, Destatis.
 Neumeier F. (2022). Ölkonzerne geben Tankrabatt zu 85 bis 100 Prozent weiter. ifo Institut. URL: https://www.ifo.de/pressemitteilung/2022-06-14/oelkonzerne-geben-tankrabatt-zu-85-bis-100-prozent-weiter
 BDEW (2022). Gaspreisanalyse September 2022. URL: https://www.bdew.de/service/daten-und-grafiken/bdew-gaspreisanalyse/
 Konfer Y. (2021). Blue Deal: Fiscal and economic effects of the AfD’s economic program. MIWI Institute. URL: https://kofner.de/archive/3853
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 BMWK (2022). Zweiter Stresstest und Maßnahmen zur Sicherung der Stromnetz-Stabilität im Winter 22/23. URL: https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/F/faq-zweiter-stresstest-massnahmen-sicherung-stromnetz-stabilitat.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=10
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 Blümm F. (2022). Ukrainekrieg: Russisches Erdgas kann durch Kernkraft ersetzt werden. Tech for Future. URL: https://www.tech-for-future.de/gas-kernkraft/b
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 Hauptstadtbüro Bioenergie (2022). Vorschlag der Bioenergiebranche. Bioenergieanlagen-bestand für die Energieversorgung im kommenden Winter nutzen. URL: https://www.hauptstadtbuero-bioenergie.de/aktuelles/positionspapiere/vorschlag-der-bioenergiebranche-bioenergieanlagenbestand-fuer-die-energieversorgung-im-kommenden-winter-nutzen
 BDEW (2022).
 BVEG (2022). Erdgasreserven und Potenziale in Deutschland. URL: https://www.bveg.de/die-branche/erdgas-und-erdoel-in-deutschland/erdgasreserven-in-deutschland/#:~:text=In%20Deutschland%20wurden%20knapp%205,(Stand%2031.12.2021).
 Elbert S. (2013). Fracking in Europa lohnt erst bei deutlich höheren Gaspreisen. ZEW. URL: https://www.zew.de/presse/pressearchiv/fracking-in-europa-lohnt-erst-bei-deutlich-hoeheren-gaspreisen
 ewi (2022). Szenarien für die Preisentwicklung von Energieträgern. Juli 2022. URL: https://www.ewi.unikoeln.de/cms/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/EWIStudie_Preisentwicklung-von-Energietraegern_220714.pdf
 Umweltbundesamt (2019). Nutzung von Flüssen: Wasserkraft. URL: https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/themen/wasser/fluesse/nutzung-belastungen/nutzung-von-fluessen-wasserkraft#wasserkraftnutzung-global
 Blümm F. (2022). Vollkosten pro kWh: Welche ist die günstigste Energiequelle 2022? Tech for Future. URL: https://www.tech-for-future.de/kosten-kwh/
 BMWK (2022).
 Fraunhofer Institut (2022). Roadmap Tiefe Geothermie Deutschland. URL: https://www.ieg.fraunhofer.de/content/dam/ieg/documents/Roadmap%20Tiefe%20Geothermie%20in%20Deutschland%20FhG%20HGF%2002022022.pdf
 Growitsch C. et al. (2013). The Costs of Power Interruptions in Germany – an Assessment in the Light of the Energiewende. ewi. URL: https://www.ewi.uni-koeln.de/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/EWI_WP_13-07-Costs-of-Power-Interruptions-in-Germany.pdf | In aktuellen Preisen (Juni 2022).
 BGR (2022). Länder weltweit mit den größten Weichbraunkohlereserven im Jahr 2020. Statista. URL: https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/37391/umfrage/weichbraunkohlereserven-der-10-wichtigsten-laender/
 Für Haushalte wurde der Effekt anhand früherer Daten des BDEW (2022) abgeschätzt, während für die Industrie neuere Daten von Blümm F. (2022) verwendet wurden.
The views expressed in this publication are solely the personal interpretations of the author and do not reflect the official position of the AfD.