Economic policy of Germany’s new coalition government: economic and welfare effects

_ Yuri Kofner, economist, MIWI Institute for Market Integration and Economic Policy. Munich, January 10, 2022.


After the federal election in September 2021, the SPD, Greens and FDP jointly won the majority of seats in the Bundestag with 52 percent of the votes. This symbolizes a further left-green shift in German society and politics. [1]

After two months of exploratory talks,[2] the Social Democrats, Greens and Liberal Democrats agreed on the formation of a coalition government, which was called the traffic light coalition after the colours of these parties.

Goal, scope and methodology

The aim of this MIWI analysis is to assess the economic and welfare effects of the economic policy of the new traffic light government on the basis of the demands and promises of the coalition agreement “Dare to make more progress” of the SPD, Greens and FDP.[3]

The scope of this study is limited to the core areas of economy, (transformation of the) industry, investments, foreign trade, transport, energy, and, of course, towering over all other sectors – climate-economic policy. This overarching department is mainly managed by the newly founded Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Protection under the direction of Dr. Robert Habeck from the Greens. Budgetary issues are taken into account in this analysis as required, while the economic and welfare effects in other relevant areas such as social affairs and pensions, European economic integration, and digitization are not dealt with here and need to be analysed in future studies.

Statistical evaluations, extrapolations, evaluations of previous relevant in-house research by the MIWI Institute, as well as external studies by leading German economic research institutes form the methodological approach of this analysis.

Since the coalition agreement defines its goals and promises up to the year 2030, the assessments of their economic effects in the present study are also oriented towards this date. The results are given as an annual average in billion euros, percent of GDP in 2019 and per capita.

Eco-social market economy

According to the coalition agreement, the declared goal of the new left-green(-yellow) government is to convert the German model of the social market economy into that of an “ecological social market economy”.

Like the traditional German model of the social market economy, which seeks a balance between economic freedom and social security, the proponents of the eco-social market model see it as a balance between ecological concerns and economic interests. In contrast to green-left fundamentalists (“System Change, not Climate Change”), this model tries to implement climate protection using market forces instead of relying solely on bans and quotas.[4]

The decision by the Greens in favour of a more market-oriented model[5] has certainly made it easier for the FDP to participate in the coalition government.

The eco-social approach advocates an expansionary monetary policy, new borrowing, and increased government spending in key areas that its supporters consider crucial for future economic growth – especially so-called “climate investments”.

For example, as his first official act as finance minister Christian Lindner from the FDP issued a supplementary budget by converting 60 billion euros into the climate and transformation fund, which remained from the 240 billion euros in debt that the previous federal government was allowed to take up only had after the proclamation of an “epidemic emergency of national scope”.[6] This misappropriation of corona-related debts is seen by economists and constitutional lawyers as a clear violation of Germany’s constitutional debt brake.[7]

A more critical ordoliberal assessment of the eco-social market economy model argues that it only superficially follows the basic principles of the market economy and that its political executors, under the pretext of climate protection, in the medium to long term will transform the economy and society into a state-run (dirigistic) or even autocratic planned economy.[8]

Just like the German federal government’s new economic policy, the EU’s “Green New Deal” may be assessed under this dispute.

Evaluation of the economic policy plans of Germany’s traffic light coalition

Climate policy

The ruling coalition has made achieving the Paris climate goals its top priority. The task is the drastic and complete transformation of the German economy and society towards climate neutrality by 2045. Like a new ideology, climate protection in the form of the reduction of CO2 emissions was confirmed as an overarching government mission to which all aspects of economic policy have to be subordinated. To this end, the stricter Climate Protection Act, like a Soviet five-year plan, in detail defines the permitted CO2 emissions per year and sector. And according to the coalition agreement, every new law will have to be subjected to a so-called climate check. In order to accomplish this gigantic task, the coalition agreement provides for a policy mix of taxes, bans, subsidies and quotas.

Carbon pricing is seen as the most important mechanism for reducing carbon emissions. The FDP sees it as the most effective in the form of an emissions allowances market.[9]

First, according to the Fuel Emissions Trading Act (BEHG), which came into force in 2021, a CO2 tax is levied on all fossil fuels. It is to be increased to 70 euros per ton of CO2 by 2024 and from 2025 onwards set by a national emissions trading system (ETS), which will probably increase the price to around 155 euros per ton of CO2 by 2030. According to estimates by the Öko-Institut, the CO2 levy will cost an annual average of 20.8 billion euros up to 2030, which is 0.6 percent of GDP or 251 euros per person.[10]

The coalition agreement supports the planned expansion of the EU emissions trading system to include heating and mobility. The German share in the reformed European ETS will cost an average of 3.7 billion euros per year, i.e. 0.1 percent of GDP or 45 euros per capita.[11]

Germany already has the second highest CO2 price in the world after Sweden.[12] This significant cost factor and its further increase until 2030 will make production in Germany less and less competitive and thus force the national industry to relocate its production facilities abroad, where there is no or lower CO2 pricing. At the same time, it will increase the substitutive elasticity to import relatively cheaper (pre-) products from these countries. In summary, this migration of production capacities is referred to as carbon leakage, as it not only represents a form of de-industrialization, but also does not reduce or even increase global net CO2 emissions. Sophisticated meta-studies estimate the negative effects of increased CO2 pricing and carbon leakage on the German economy to be between 0.6 and 1.6 percent of GDP.[13],[14]

However, instead of abolishing CO2 pricing, the coalition government is instead supporting the introduction of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) at the EU level, a complicated and bureaucratic import duty that will be levied on foreign imports into the EU based on their average “CO2 content”. According to a comprehensive research report by the European Commission, the CBAM will cost the German economy around 7.7 billion euros annually (0.2 percent of GDP or 93 euros per citizen).[15]

The federal government not only wants to make Germany climate neutral by 2045, but also emphasizes the need for negative emissions. To this end, it wants to support the development and market ramp-up of technologies for carbon capture and storage (CCS). According to research by KfW, the average annual investments in this area, which must be made possible at current and near-cost levels primarily through state aid, will amount to around 16.9 billion euros or 0.5 percent of GDP or 204 euros per person.[16]

The ruling proponents of carbon pricing are aware that this unpopular measure will increase the cost of living for the population and hit poor households particularly hard, as they will have to spend a relatively higher proportion of their income on mobility, electricity, heating, and food (even for the average household this amounted to 52.2 percent of private consumer spending in 2020).[17] The coalition agreement is therefore considering the introduction of monetary social compensation – the so-called climate money. According to previous statements by the Greens and the SPD as well as relevant research publications closely related to these parties, this climate money will amount to around 118 euros per person per year, which corresponds to 9.8 billion euros or 0.3 percent of the national GDP.[18],[19],[20] This supposed compensation therefore will give less than half of the national CO2 levy burden back to the citizens.

Energy turnaround

As part of its climate ambitions, the traffic light coalition announced that it would accelerate the energy transition and the transition to an electricity- and hydrogen-based economy.

In 2020, gross electricity generation in Germany (544.9 TWh) exceeded gross electricity demand (565.9 TWh) by 21 TWh.[21] Due to the increased use of electricity for transport, heating and H2 generation, the EWI estimates an increase in domestic electricity demand to almost 700 TWh by 2030.[22]

Sticking to the phase-out of nuclear energy by 2023, moving up the planned phase-out of coal from 2038 to 2030, and the planned switch from natural gas to hydrogen power will create an electricity gap of around 87 TWh by 2030, which will have to be covered by imports, as the domestic electricity generation will only reach approx. 611 TWh.[23]

The accelerated expansion of volatile and weather-dependent PV and wind power at the expense of base-load capable and controllable nuclear and coal power will massively undermine security of supply. In 2019, Germany’s installed output of base-loadable and controllable energy (105 GW) exceeded the annual peak demand (82 GW) by 23 GW.[24] By 2030, available capacity (including realistically feasible energy storage) will shrink to 70 GW, while annual peak demand will reach 94 GW, creating a capacity gap of 24 GW. According to another ewi study, this (typically winter) capacity gap could cost the German economy around 0.4 percent of GDP or EUR 13.5 billion (EUR 162 per capita) in 2030.[25]

In order to at least partially alleviate this problem, energy market researchers are considering the introduction of so-called “demand side management”, the euphemistic term for the controlled, temporary shutdown of the electricity supply for certain sectors. In 2030 this could “save” 4 GW of demand. This would affect up to 11.3 percent of the industrial sector or up to 54 percent of e-mobility.[26]  Chancellor Olaf Scholz of the SPD hinted at this possibility during an election debate in summer 2021.[27]

The coalition agreement provides for the drastic expansion of renewable energies – especially photovoltaics and wind power – to 80 percent of the energy mix by 2030 (from 44.6 percent in 2020).[28] The most important instrument for promoting the expansion of renewable energies in the past 20 years has been the EEG surcharge paid by the consumer and the priority feed-in at the expense of the base load and control power plants. In 2020, the EEG redistribution amounted to 30.9 billion euros.[29] Despite the widespread misconception, the traffic light government will not abolish the EEG surcharge per se but will only partially finance it through the budget. The planned expansion of renewable energies will double the total costs for EEG funding to up to 65.5 billion euros. This corresponds to an annual average of 48.2 billion euros, i.e., 1.4 percent of GDP or 581 euros per citizen.

The coalition agreement mentions the evaluation of new instruments and mechanisms in the electricity market design to ensure secure electricity supply capacities (from renewable sources). Making EEG funding dependent on the provision of base load and control power, e.g., via the combined power plant remuneration model (KKV), would be a welcome compromise in order to set further financial incentives for renewables, while at the same time increasing the base load stability and lower the overall EEG state funding.[30] However, it seems unlikely that the coalition government will implement such an approach, as this would counteract its over-ambitious goal of achieving 80 percent “green” electricity by 2030.

The KfW promotional bank estimates the investments into the national energy system required to achieve the energy turnaround and to achieve climate neutrality to be around EUR 28 billion a year (0.8 percent of GDP or EUR 338 per capita).[31]

The expansion of volatile wind and solar energy alone will more than double the costs for net stabilization measures from 1.1 to 2.4 billion euros in 2030. This corresponds to average annual costs of 1.7 billion euros or 20 euros per person (0.1 percent of GDP).[32]

Germany already has the highest electricity prices in the world. Overall, the above-described deepening of the energy transition will, according to estimates by Prognos AG, increase electricity prices by a further 50 percent. This would mean an increase from 31.4 to 62.8 euro cents per KWh for households and from 18.6 to 37.2 euro cents per KWh for industry.[33]

As explained above, the coalition is considering introducing climate money in order to alleviate the cost pressure on private households from CO2 pricing and the energy transition. In order to reduce carbon leakage pressure for large energy-intensive industries, the traffic light government not only supports the EU CO2 border adjustment but is also considering subsidizing an industrial electricity price. Assuming the benchmark will be the average EU price level for large industrial consumers, the average annual funding amount would be 11.6 billion euros (0.3 percent of GDP) or 140 euros per capita.[34]

The traffic light coalition wants to expand the photovoltaic capacities from 54 GW in 2020 to 200 GW by 2030 and provide 2 percent of the land area for wind power plants. For comparison: That would mean creating a solar park larger than the Saarland federal state (2920 km2) and a wind park the size of the county of Upper Franconia (7148 km2).

Economy and industry transformation

The decarbonisation of the German economy and the transformation of the domestic industry towards climate neutrality are the declared goals of the coalition agreement, the achievement of which is to be supported through extensive state aid.

The coalition agreement provides for so-called Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCfD) as an essential means of financing the costly retrofitting of industrial production capacities. With this funding instrument, the state guarantees planning security for investments in “climate-friendly” production processes by paying the difference between the abatement costs of the companies and the current CO2 certificate price.[35]

It is currently too early to estimate the total costs of this funding measure. However, on behalf of KfW promotional bank, Prognos AG estimates the average annual investments that are deemed necessary for the decarbonization of the German industrial complex to achieve the climate neutrality benchmark by 2045 to be around EUR 20.7 billion annually, which is 0.6 Percent of GDP or 250 euros per capita.[36]

And anyway, the state-owned KfW development bank has a special role in the plans of the red-green-yellow coalition government. They want to use this development bank as an “investment and innovation agency” to finance decarbonisation, digitalisation, and infrastructure projects. Because the KfW can take on new debts on the international financial market (thanks to guarantees from the federal government at almost no interest rate) without these being added to the national debt and thus being seen as a violation of the constitutional debt brake. It is possible that the above-mentioned 60 billion euros, which the new finance ministry has rededicated from the Corona debt for the Climate and Innovation Fund, will be used as federal guarantees for KfW. During the exploratory talks, there was talk of 50 billion euros for additional climate protection investments through KfW.[37] This would correspond to government investments of 15 to 12.5 billion euros annually (0.4 percent of GDP or 151 euros per capita). The economic research institute IW Cologne puts the necessary annual sum for decarbonization, digitization and R&D of such a state investment fund at a similar sum of around 12 billion euros.[38] According to another IW study, this increase in government spending would increase gross domestic product by just under 0.3 percent (EUR 8.8 billion or EUR 105 per inhabitant).[39]

As a support instrument for investments, the development bank can either take on guarantees for loans from private banks or even silent participations in entrepreneurial capital. As the economist Lars P. Feld rightly warns, the second approach in particular would entail a disturbing process of creeping nationalization of the German industry and economy.[40]

The coalition government intends for women and people with a migrant background to play a bigger role in the economy. However, instead of offering better educational offers based on the ordoliberal principle of “equality of opportunity”, the green-left government clearly adheres to the socialist concept of “equality of outcome”, which is reflected in proposals such as, e.g., lowering the access barriers to venture capital for these population groups or introducing a gender parity rule in the aforementioned KfW investment fund. However, empirical observations show that such quota approaches of “positive” discrimination usually have the opposite effect.[41]

The traffic light government is clearly committed to a dirigistic industrial policy by defining key technologies and future markets, setting quotas for sectoral CO2 emissions and public procurement, granting subsidies, and banning technologies that are considered “dirty”. In particular, the coalition defines three such lead markets – hydrogen, semiconductors and electromobility.

A national hydrogen industry with an electrolysis capacity of 10 GW is to be established by 2030. State funding for hydrogen technologies and infrastructure will amount to around 1 billion euros (12 euros per person) annually.[42],[43]

Furthermore, Germany is to become part of a Europe-wide semiconductor and microprocessor hub in order to make it more autonomous of Asian supply chains. As part of this task, the annual funding for this technology branch is currently set at 0.4 billion euros (5 euros per person).[44],[45]

The federal government supports this planning industrial policy not only for the purpose of climate protection, but also with the pragmatic calculation of making Germany a market leader and export champion in green lead markets. This hope is based on the enormous market potential (volume) of these industries and the currently relatively promising market shares of German companies in this area.[46],[47] But so far, and despite considerable government support to make Germany the market leader in green technologies, these plans do not seem to be working. Between 2010 and 2019, compared to exports from China, exports from Germany of these goods groups either stalled or even fell: solar modules (minus 71 vs. minus 6 percent), inverters (plus 14 vs. plus 43 percent), wind turbines (plus 10 vs. plus 860 percent!), electrolysers (50 percent decrease vs. 42 percent increase!).[48]

In contrast to this macro-planning-interventionist approach, the FDP-influenced proposal to enable special economic zones (SEZ) and real laboratories is a pleasant and welcome surprise in the coalition agreement.

Traffic turnaround

In order to achieve the climate goals in the transport sector, the coalition government wants to transform the country’s most important and most innovative manufacturing industry in the direction of electromobility – the German automotive industry, which directly employs 830,000 people and generates 4.7 percent of the national GDP.[49] As a benchmark for this, the coalition agreement sets a quota of 15 million fully battery electric vehicles (BEVs) by 2030, which would mean a thirty-fold increase from the current 0.5 million BEVs that were on German roads in October 2021.[50]

In order to achieve this, a massive expansion of the charging infrastructure of 1 million charging stations by 2030 is necessary – and also planned. According to a comprehensive study by the Energy Economics Institute at the University of Cologne, investments of 4 billion euros (48 euros per capita or 0.1 percent of GDP) are required annually, most of which must be financed by the public sector. The electrification of the transport sector will increase the nationwide electricity demand by around 10 percent (plus 43 TWh) by 2030.[51]

Second, a bonus-malus policy mix is ​​planned, including the CO2 levy discussed above, purchase bonuses for e-cars, an increase in the CO2 share in the vehicle tax and truck toll, limiting the company car tax exemption to BEVs, zero emission zones in large cities, the abolition of the diesel privilege, as well as registration bans for cars with combustion engines before 2035. All of this is planned in the coalition agreement, but not introducing a speed limit on motorways was celebrated as a great success by the FDP.

Taken together, this policy mix costs the German economy 0.3 percent of GDP (10.5 billion euros) annually, which equates to an additional burden of 127 euros for every citizen. According to Prognos AG, the price for a litre of petrol will rise to 1.9 to 2.5 euros and for diesel to 2 to 2.6 euros by 2030. Euro.[52]

According to estimates by KfW Research and Prognos AG, the necessary climate investments in road traffic amount to around 75.5 bln euros per year, i.e. 2.2 percent of GDP or 910 euros per citizen.[53],[54]

Here too, apart from the envisaged climate protection target, it is hoped that this massive intervention will make the German automotive industry a leader in the proposed future market of electric battery production and e-mobility. In fact, the federal republic’s chances in this area are better than with other green technologies. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee of success: For example, between 2009 and 2019, German battery exports tripled as did Chinese. However, the global market share of the People’s Republic in this product group rose from 24 to 29 percent, that of the FRG only from 6 to 7 percent.[55]  However, the ifo Institute estimates that the switch to e-mobility in the German automotive industry will result in a net job loss of over 385,000 German employees by 2030.[56]

Despite the relatively large potential of synthetic fuels (power-to-fuel, PtX), the coalition agreement only briefly mentions support for this technology in connection with the decarbonization of air and shipping traffic. Synthetic fuels offer considerable prospects for saving CO2 emissions and creating a CO2 cycle economy, while at the same time the added value of the internal combustion engine technology is maintained in Germany and offers significant export potential to emerging countries. In contrast to e-batteries, Germany still has the chance to become the a market leader in the production and marketing of conversion systems for the production of synthetic hydrocarbon fuels. According to IW Cologne, targeted funding for research and development in this area can create around 30 billion euros in added value and a total of almost 400,000 new jobs in German mechanical and plant engineering.[57]

Foreign trade

As in the other areas, the coalition government wants to redesign the republic’s foreign trade relations according to stricter ecological and social sustainability criteria and participate in the EU’s demand for more technological autonomy, which will de facto replace Germany’s historically successful free trade approach with a new “climate protectionism”. Examples are the CBAM discussed above, a revision of existing and planned preferential trade agreements, a new investment screening mechanism and the supply chain laws at federal and EU level.

The planned EU screening mechanism would review and also forbid foreign direct investments in strategic European sectors, especially from China, if these were made possible with the help of foreign state aid or if they violate European security interests. Its introduction will most likely trigger retaliatory tariffs, especially since both Germany and the EU themselves are increasingly relying on state subsidies and a dirigistic industrial policy.[58]

Far from improving human rights, working conditions and ecological standards in developing countries, the supply chain legislation will hurt both the German economy and the supplier countries. On the one hand, it will significantly affect the already very strained value chains of German companies and increase the costs for raw materials and intermediate products even further. In the worst case, up to 7 percent of German imports with a total value of 77.3 billion euros (2.3 percent of GDP or 931 euros per inhabitant) could be affected, because these come from countries that, according to the assessment of the International Trade Union Confederation (IGB) show “critical to catastrophic working conditions”.[59] On the other hand, the German companies affected will have to withdraw from these supplier countries, which will force the employees there (including children) into even worse working conditions in the informal sector; as well as their gross national product, such as that of Cambodia, Vietnam and Malaysia, will be reduced by up to 1 percent.[60]

The coalition partners currently see no possibility of supporting further negotiations on the EU-China investment agreement, which would otherwise increase German GDP by 0.02 percent.[61] To this end, they support the conclusion of free trade agreements between the EU with MERCOSUR, the African Union and are even considering the implementation of a revised trade and economic partnership with the USA (“TTIP 2.0”). As a result, these agreements could increase the GDP of the federal republic by 0.1, 0.4 or 3.1 percent, i.e., a cumulative 3.6 percent (approx. 120 billion euros per year), which would make every German wealthier by around 1,450 euros.[62] However, since the free trade relations would be subject to stricter ecological, human rights and labour law standards, the positive effects are likely to be less.


The present analysis shows that the economic policy of the SPD, Greens and FDP outlined in the coalition agreement almost exclusively entails new burdens and subsidies.

If it weren’t for the EU’s common foreign trade policy, the coalition agreement would hardly provide any relief for the German economy, apart from considerations on the potential creation of special economic zones (SEZ), the scope of which and thus their economic effects cannot yet be assessed.

The economic policy burdens (taxes, levies, red tape, etc.) planned by the traffic light government to save the climate will cost the German economy by EUR 133.3 billion (4 percent of GDP) annually by 2030, which means that every German citizen will be poorer by EUR 1,606 per year.

At the same time, the red-green-yellow federal policy will distribute funding for tasks such as climate protection, energy transition, industrial transformation in a total amount of up to 237.5 billion, which corresponds to 7 percent of GDP or 2,864 euros per person.

If the coalition were to plan to cover these expenses with the above-mentioned revenue (burdens) alone, there would still be a budget deficit of 104.2 billion euros (44.2 billion euros more than finance minister Linder’s 60 billion conversion for the Climate and Transformation Fund), which would have to be financed either through new borrowing, tax increases or savings elsewhere.

Many established German economists, especially those who tend towards the green-left spectrum, but not exclusively, see climate protection investments as positive and argue that they create lead markets in which German companies will have a competitive edge and thus secure future economic growth. Other, predominantly liberal economists, such as Stefan Kooths, Co-President of the IfW Kiel, are more sceptical and argue that the public subsidies for decarbonisation or the development of state-selected leading industries are only a form of distorting intervention policy that rather have a substitutive than a multiplicative character.[63] In fact, by focusing on selected technologies and approaches in terms of financial and regulatory policy, the state could actually inhibit future growth, as it thereby deprives resources that private entrepreneurs would have invested in unexpected other and potentially much more successful innovations in an alternative market order that would have been more open to competition and other technologies, e.g. in the field nuclear fusion and climate adaptation.

The present study follows the second interpretation, in which both the burdens and the subsidies are summarized as negative economic effects of the economic policy described in the coalition agreement. If one corrects the free trade facilitation, the left-green economic redistribution policy of the SPD, Greens and FDP will cost the German economy over 250 billion euros each year, which makes up over 7 percent of GDP and will take away over 3,000 euros annually from every German citizen.

Table 1. Annual economic effects of the economic policy outlined in the traffic light coalition agreement (2020-2030)

Policy measure Type in bln euros (2019) in percent of (2019) per capita (2019)
Climate policy
CO2 levy Burden 20,8 0,6 251
EU ETS Burden 3,7 0,1 45
CBAM Burden 7,7 0,2 93
CCS Subsidy 16,9 0,5 204
Climate money Subsidy 9,8 0,3 118
Energy turnaround
Capacity gap Burden 13,5 0,4 162
EEG subsidy Subsidy 48,2 1,4 581
Expanding renewables Subsidy 28 0,8 338
Grid stability Burden 1,7 0,1 20
Industrial electricity Subsidy 11,6 0,3 140
Industrial transformation
CCfD / Decarbonization Subsidy 20,7 0,6 250
KfW Subsidy 12,5 0,4 151
Hydrogen Subsidy 1 0 12
Semi-conductors Subsidy 0,4 0 5
Traffic turnaround
Charging stations Subsidy 4 0,1 48
E-Mobility Burden 8,6 0,3 104
E-Mobility I Subsidy 8,9 0,3 107
E-Mobility II Subsidy 75,5 2,2 910
Foreign trade
Supply chain laws Burden 77,3 2,3 931
FTAs Relief 120 3,6 1450
Total burden 133,3 4 1606
Total subsidy 237,5 6,9 2864
Difference (B-S) 104,2 2,9 1258
Total relief 120 3,6 1450
Total redistribution (B+S-R) 250,8 7,3 3020

Quelle: MIWI Institute.


[1] SPD, Grüne, FDP (2021). Ergebnis der Sondierungen zwischen SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN und FDP. URL:

[2] Siehe, z.B.: Barbara Unmüßig B., Fuhr L., Fatheuer T. (2021). Kritik der Grünen Ökonomie. Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. URL:

[3] Bundesregierung (2021). Koalitionsvertrag zwischen SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und FDP

[4] Achieving political-ecological “missions” through the creation and management of markets is the main proposal of the influential economist Marianna Mazzucato. In November 2021, the Erasmus Foundation held a detailed seminar with value-conservative evaluation of her works.

[5] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (2019). Zukunftsfähig wirtschaften für nachhaltigen Wohlstand – Rahmen setzen für die sozial-ökologische Marktwirtschaft. Beschluss der Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz. URL:

[6] Tagesschau (2021). Lindner plant “Booster” für die Wirtschaft. URL:

[7] Greive M., Olk J. (2021). „Verfassungsbruch par excellence“: Staatsrechtler halten milliardenschwere Rücklage für unzulässig. Handelsblatt. URL:

[8] E.g.: Hülsmann J.G. (2020). Toward a Political Economy of Climate Change. MISES Institute. URL:

[9] FDP (2019). Emissionshandel ist das beste Klimaschutz-Konzept. URL:

[10] Matthes F. et al. (2021). CO2-Bepreisung und die Reform der Steuern und Umlagen auf Strom: Die Umfinanzierung der Umlage des Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetzes. Öko-Institut. URL:

[11] Matthes F. et al. (2021).

[12] Böhm J., Peterson S. (2021). Fossil fuel subsidy inventories vs. net carbon prices: A consistent approach for measuring fossil fuel price incentives. IfW Kiel. URL:

[13] Branger F., Quirion P. (2013). Would border carbon adjustments prevent carbon leakage and heavy industry competitiveness losses? Insights from a meta-analysis of recent economic studies. Ecological Economics 99: 29-39,

[14] Böhringer C., Peterson S. et al. (2021). Climate Policies after Paris: Pledge, Trade, and Recycle. IfW Kiel. URL:

[15] European Commission (2021). Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism. URL:

[16] Brand S. et al. (2021). 5 Bio. EUR klimafreundlich investieren – eine leistbare Herausforderung. KfW Research. URL:

[17] Destatis (2020). Durchschnittliche Höhe der Konsumausgaben je Haushalt* im Monat in Deutschland nach Verwendungszweck im Jahr 2019. URL:

[18] Kemfert C. et al. (2021). Bayern klimaneutral und sozial – Maßnahmenvorschläge für eine soziale Klimatransformation in Bayern. DIW, SPD-Fraktion im Bayerischen Landtag. URL:

[19] Kalkuhl M. (2021). Sozialer Ausgleich für Klimaschutz. WiWo. URL:

[20] Magoley N. (2021). Bundesparteitag: Grüne auf dem Weg zur Mitte. WDR. URL:

[21] BDEW (2021). Stromerzeugung und -verbrauch in Deutschland. URL:

[22] ewi (2021). Klimaneutralität 2045 – Transformation der Verbrauchssektoren und des Energiesystems. Deutsche Energie-Agentur (dena). URL:

[23] Own estimations based on: ewi (2021).

[24] MWIDE (2021). Versorgungssicherheit. URL: | ewi (2021).

[25] E-CUBE Strategy, ewi (2020). 2030 Peak Power Demand in North-West Europe. URL:

[26] Own estimations based on: ewi (2021).

[27] Deutschlandkurier (2021). Ökosozialistische Planwirtschaft: SPD-Scholz träumt schon von Stromrationierung! URL:

[28] BDEW (2020). Anteil Erneuerbarer Energien an der Bruttostromerzeugung in Deutschland in den Jahren 1990 bis 2020. URL:

[29] Zaboji N. (2021). Ökostromförderung erreicht Rekord. FAZ. URL:

[30] Kofner Y. (2021). Ensuring supply-side security of the German energy transition: introducing the combined power plant concept (KKV). MIWI Institute. URL:

[31] Brand S. et al. (2021).

[32] Own estimations based on: Kirchner A. (2021). Bezahlbare Strompreise. Anhörung im Bayerischen Landtag. Prognos AG.

[33] Eigene Berechnungen basierend auf:  Faltlhauser M. (2020). Zahlen und Fakten zur Stromversorgung in Deutschland. Wirtschaftsbeirat Bayern. URL:

[34] Own estimations based on: BDEW (2020). Energiemarkt Deutschland 2020. URL: | ewi (2021). | BMWi, Eurostat (2021). Electricity prices for industries in the European Union in 2020, by country. URL:

[35] Richstein J., Neuhoff K. (2019). CO2-Differenzverträge für innovative Klimalösungen in der Industrie. DIW. URL:

[36] Prognos AG. (2021). Beitrag von Green Finance zum Erreichen von Klimaneutralität in Deutschland. KfW. URL:

[37] Marschall B. (2021). Wie die Staatsbank KfW für die Ampel das Klima retten soll. RP Online. URL:

[38] Beznoska M., Kauder B., Obst T. (2021). Investitionen, Humankapital und Wachstumswirkungen öffentlicher Ausgaben. IW Köln. URL:

[39] Own estimations based on: Hüther M., Kolev G. (2019). Investitionsfonds für Deutschland. IW Köln. URL:

[40] Feld L.P. (2021). Ein KfW-Transformationsfonds wäre ein Fehler. Handelsblatt. URL:

[41] Kofner Y. (2021). Women’s quotas are counterproductive and morally wrong. MIWI Institute. URL:

[42] Prognos AG. (2021). KfW.

[43] Hydrogen Europe (2020). Geplante Investitionen in grünen Wasserstoff und Elektrolysekapazitäten in Europa nach Ländern bis zum Jahr 2030. URL:

[44] Laaser C.F., Rosenschon A. (2020). Kieler Subventionsbericht 2020: Subventionen auf dem Vormarsch. IfW Kiel.  Die Schätzungen sind ohne das fiskalische Corona-Konjunkturpaket. URL:

[45] Laaser C.F, Rosenschon A., Schrader K. (2021). Kieler Subventionsbericht: Die Finanzhilfen des Bundes in Zeiten der Coronakrise. IfW Kiel. URL:

[46] Römer D. et al. (2021). Die Zukunft ist grün – welche Chancen bieten sich der deutschen Wirtschaft? KfW Research. URL:

[47] Schaefer T., Matthes J. (2021). Weltweiter Klimaschutz bringt neue Absatzchancen auch für deutsche Hersteller. IW Köln. URL: 

[48] Matthes J., Schaefer T. (2021). Exportperformance von Gütern zur Herstellung erneuerbarer Energien enttäuscht. IW Köln. URL:

[49] Puls T. (2021). Strukturwandel in der Automobilindustrie – wirkt die Pandemie als Beschleuniger? IW Köln- URL:

[50] KBA (2021). Anzahl der Elektroautos in Deutschland von 2011 bis 2021. URL:

[51] ewi (2021).

[52] Auf der Maur A., Trachsel T. (2021). Zielpfade für den Klimaschutz im Verkehrssektor. Prognos. URL:

[53] Brand S. et al. (2021).

[54] Auf der Maur A., Trachsel T. (2021).

[55] OEC (2021). Share of Exports in Electric Batteries. URL:

[56] Falck O., Czernich, N., Koenen J. (2021). Auswirkungen der vermehrten Produktion elektrisch betriebener Pkw auf die Beschäftigung in Deutschland. ifo Institut. URL:

[57] Fritsch M., Puls T., Schaefer T. (2021).  Synthetische Kraftstoffe: Potenziale für Europa: Klimaschutz- und Wertschöpfungseffekte eines Hochlaufs der Herstellung klimafreundlicher flüssiger Energieträger. IW Köln. URL:

[58] Kofner Y. (2020). EU’s new anti-foreign-subsidies tool likely to invoke new wave of protectionism. MIWI Institute. URL:

[59] Felbermayr G. et al. (2021). Chancen und Risiken eines Sorgfaltspflichtengesetzes. IfW Kiel. URL:

[60] Kolev G., Neligan A. (2021). Nachhaltigkeit in Lieferketten. IW Köln. URL:

[61] European Commission (2013). Impact assessment report on the EU-China investment relations. URL:

[62] Own estimations based on: Kofner Y. (2020). Benefits for Germany of a post-COVID EU region-to-region free trade initiative. MIWI Institute. URL:

[63] Kooths S. (2021). Grüne Konjunkturpolitik – Herausforderungen und Chancen. IfW Kiel. URL: